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Houli
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« on: April 03, 2010, 10:51:17 pm »


PLAN


Issued By: Houlihan A.
Issued To: 315th RRC
DTC: 09MAR19031300
Form #: 03091300OCHA
Parent Form#: 03091200OBSG


SITUATION
Tensions have risen greatly within the last twenty-four hours in Czechoslovakia.  Pro-democracy demonstrations reached a crescendo yesterday and last night as to force Czech President Husak to the bargaining table.  Meetings regarding the demands of the pro-democracy movement are to occur on 15MAR1989.  Until that time, the leaders of the pro-democracy movement have agreed to a “cease fire” of sorts, and the government has agreed to dispatch Czech troops to provide “security” for the Soviet units that have been based in Czechoslovakia since the 1968 uprising.

6th Brigade is increasing its readiness in anticipation of possible hostile actions from Soviet or Warsaw Pact forces in reaction to the Czech situation.

ENEMY - Since the addendum to the Berlin Agreement of 1972, Soviet troops have been garrisoned on the eastern side of the boarder.
S: Unknown.
A: Light training.
L: The Janke mine, east of the east-west boarder.
U: East German standard.
T: 1972 to present.
E: Mostly unknown. Small arms.
FRIENDLY - 315th RRC to arrive at 40784593 on 12MAR1989.
Higher: 6th Brigade moving toward full combat readiness.
Adjacent: The 42nd Engr. Co. mostly departed from the AO.
Supporting: One FV571 and crew from the British 11th Hussars.
WEATHER - BMNT:NA; EENT:NA; MR:NA; MS:NA; %CC:100; % Precip:90; HT:Upper50s; LT:Mid40s;


MISSION
COMMANDER’S INTENT - The 315th RRC will relieve the 42nd Engr. Co. NLT 03MAR19890900.  The 315th RRC will be combat ready NLT 16MAR19890000.
a. Key Tasks:
     i. Set up personnel, operations, supply, and mess facilities.
     ii. Set up communications infrastructure: phone and radio.
     iii. Patrol HQ area for watch positions, fighting positions, and avenues of approach.
     vi. Patrol entire western portion of AO.
b. End State: The 315th RRC will have HQ set up at 40784593,and will have aggressively patrolled the surrounding areas so as to enable offensive and/or defensive operations should the need arise.
c. Purpose: To fulfill the 6th Brigade intent to become fully combat ready.  To prepare the 315th RRC for actions possibly necessitated by the potential fallout of rising international tensions.


EXECUTION
SoM -
a. Initial Convoy arrives at HQ location NLT 12MAR19891200.
b. Remaining forces arrive at HQ location NLT 14MAR19891500
c. Patrol all tactically significant areas west of the border.
FIRE SUPPORT PLAN - None.
COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS
ToA - NA.
Base Unit - 315th RRC initial convoy.
Tactical Control Measures - AA: NA; AK: NA; LoD:40704593 to 40704590; AS: NA; OB:40784593: NA;


ADMIN/LOGISTICS
FOOD AND WATER - MREs will sustain the company until the MKT-85 is set up.  After MKT-85 setup, the mess section will provide A and T rations, and the supply section will provide MREs.
AMMUNITION - Small arms rounds carried with troops.  AT rounds and claymore mines, supplied by Company S4.
SUPPLY - The brigade asset MKT-85 has been provided, and will be attached to the initial convoy.
MEDICAL - The ready tent will be equipped with a substantial medkit.  Vehicles and personnel also supply their own medkits.
EMERGENCY - East Wind 3 Standard Procedures.


COMMAND/SIGNAL
SoC - Houlihan, Warnick, Hoober, Kelley, Stout, Swayze, Perez, Stein, Cox, Thomas D., Bowman, White, Thomas Da., Northcut, Mercer.
SIGNALS -
a. Radio -
     i. 315th RRC units moving into position are to communicate on 55.5 MHz during the transportation phase.
     ii. Once in position, 315th RRC will coordinate with British Scout unit and determine a local comms plan that will
          allow intercommunication between units.
    iii. 315th RRC will at all times monitor the 502nd Infantry command net at 45.8 MHz.
    vi.   315th will communicate with friendly air assets on 243.0 MHz with a back up frequency of 255.0 MHz.
b. Visual -  TBD.
« Last Edit: April 03, 2010, 10:54:41 pm by Houli » Logged
Houli
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« Reply #1 on: April 03, 2010, 10:51:47 pm »


PERFORMANCE



09MAR1989, Tuesday
11:00 - 315th RRC receives new AO assignment--Bergbau des Konsumvereins Janke das Sudliche Berlin, or the Janke Mine.  The Janke Mine lies in the Berlin District, on the East-West boarder.  NATO, wanting the mine to heat the West Berlin populace, and The Warsaw Pact, wanting to power nearby industrial centers, compromised joint operation in the Berlin Agreement.  1961 Berlin Wall construction bypassed The Janke Mine.  Mine operations reduced in the late 1960’s, and in the 1972 addendum to the Berlin agreement divided the mine east and west.

Before being completely dismantled and replaced by the 368th light tropo scatter company, 315th RRC is assigned to relieve the 49th Engineers in order to allow 6th Brigade to maximize combat readiness.


12MAR1989, Friday
11:14 - Initial company convoy reaches the Janke Mine.  Hoober, Swayze, and Northcut arrive at AO in truck number 6025.

12:36 - Expected inclement weather begins.  Ingress/egress roads to the company’s planned HQ location quickly degenerate.

12:44 - Warnick and Fitzgerald arrive at AO.

15:01 - Stout and Johnson arrive at AO in truck number 6035.

16:39 - Cox arrives at AO.

16:57 - HQ setup commences, starting with erection of the GP Medium Supply Tent.

17:08 - Houlihan arrives at AO.

17:45 - After failure to ingress into HQ location, truck number 6035, containing badly needed infrastructure, is parked in assembly area--out of walking distance from NATO HQ location 40784593.  Expected serious impact on 315th RRC operations.

18:04 - MKT-85 failure to ingress.  Parked at Bard area.

19:12 - TOC CPM Tent construction unexpectedly halted until final components arrive in 13MAR2010 convoy.

23:00 - Supply Tent erection complete.

23:50 - Lights out.  Personnel on site sleep in Supply Tent.


13MAR1989, Saturday
06:30 - First call.

08:27 - Beik arrives at AO.

10:14 - Personnel GP Small and 10-Man Arctic tents erected.

12:12 - Second leg of convoy arrives.  Bowman arrives at AO.  Embedded British Armor crew arrives with Convoy 6045--FV571 and crew Thomas D., and Thomas Da.

12:40 - FV571 break down.

14:47 - TOC CPM Tent erected.

15:11 - Final leg of convoy arrives at AO.  Perez, Stein, and Josh arrive.

17:59 - TOC fully operational.


14MAR1989, Sunday
08:00 - First Call.

08:30 - Stand To.  Thomas Da. 00:03:02 late.

10:07 - Beik, Cox, and Bowman go on patrol.  See OPORD number 03140930OCWD (DNE).

14:00 - Beik departs AO.

15:54 - FV571 repaired oil filter gasket.


15MAR1989, Monday
07:30 - First Call.

07:58 - Intel update received from 6th Brigade:
Czechoslovakian President Husak to meet with Czech pro-democracy movement leaders today at 12:00.

08:00 - Stand  To.

09:40 - Squads train IMTs and battle drills.

11:32 - Cox, Stein, and Josh go on patrol.

11:56 - Bowman and Warnick go on patrol.

11:06 - FV571 weapon malfunction.

11:59 - Stout, Johnson, and Perez depart from AO.  Truck 6035 incapable of reaching HQ location.

14:44 - Angela and Stein go on patrol.

15:30 - Warnick and Cox go on long range patrol.

17:29 - Intel update from 6th Brigade:
In the 12:00 meeting between Czechoslovakian President Husak and Czech pro-democracy leaders, Husak was pressured into agreeing to create an interim coalition government.  Elections are anticipated for December of this year.  Husak has ordered the removal of all Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia, and has stated that the Czech army will remove them by force if necessary.  6th Brigade concludes this is feasible, as the Soviet forces stationed there are garrison troops.  Czechoslovakia is waiting for a response from the Soviets.

U.S. Army has moved from DEFCON 4 to DEFCON 2.

Classified Secret code books have been employed.  Radio traffic not using classified secret code books is strictly prohibited.

21:00 - Patrol sent out.


16MAR1989, Tuesday
02:09 - Large bang heard due south of camp.  Distance roughly 200-600 meters.

03:49 - Intel received from 6th Brigade:
Last night at 23:00 hours, the Soviet garrison at Strachenses, Czechoslovakia formed up to move out.  A crowd of Czech civilians gathered.  The crowed grew angry as they observed the Soviets not moving out fast enough.  The gathering escalated to a demonstration, in turn, to a riot, and culminated in a full force attack.  The Soviet troops were decimated.  The Czech army moved in to put the situation under control and gather the Soviet dead.  Less then a dozen Soviet troops remain MIA.

07:30 - First Call.

08:00 - Stand To.  Intel updates disseminated to company.  Company on full alert.

12:33 - Intel received from 6th Brigade:
At 10:00 today Soviet and East German forces crossed the boarder into Czechoslovakia under the mandate to secure Soviet personnel.  The U.S., Great Britain, and West Germany have declared active war on The Soviet Union and East Germany

12:46 - OPORD received from 6th Brigade.  See OPORD 03161246OBSG.

13:11 - Stein and White go on patrol.  See OPORD 03161311OCDW.

15:30 - Patrol 03161311OCDW ambushes two enemy at 46104043.  Two enemy killed, including Russian Company Commander Josef Jakinovich Abikov.  Intel gathered from enemy.  See AAR 03161211ACSJ.

13:20 - Cox and Bowman go on patrol.  See OPORD 78161320OCDW.

15:59 - Stein and White RTB.  See AAR 03161211ACDW.

17:56 - Cox and Bowman RTB.  See OPORD 78161320OCDW.


17MAR1989, Wednesday
03:34 - Houlihan, Hoober, White, Thomas D. Thomas Da. (White Knight) go on patrol.  See OPORD 03170230OCHA.

03:15 - Warnick and Cox go on patrol.  See OPORD 03170230OCDW (DNE).

06:50 - White Knight RTB.  See AAR 03170230ACHA.

09:30 - Warnick and Cox RTB.  See AAR 03170230ACDW (DNE).

15:00 - Stein and Bowman go on patrol near enemy base.  See OPORD 03171500OCDW.

17:00 - Enemy BTR destroyed.  Two enemy infantry killed.  See AAR 03171500ACSJ.

15:35 - Warnick, Kelley, Thomas Da, and White. go on patrol to lay fake phone wire.  See OPORD 03171534OCDW (DNE).

17:20 - Stein and Bowman finish patrol.  See AAR 03171500ACSJ.

17:30 - Warnick, Kelley, Thomas Da, and White finish patrol.  See AAR 03171534ACDW (DNE).

21:47 - Houlihan, Warnick, Stein, Bowman, White, Thomas D., Thomas Da. go on patrol.  See OPORD 03172045OCHA.

23:05 - 315th RRC sustains one casualty.  Warnick D, minor flesh wound during patrol 03172045OCHA.  Bandaged and RTB safely.  See AAR 03172045ACHA.

00:07 - Half of patrol 03172045OCHA (Stein, White, Thomas D., Thomas Da.) RTB.  See AAR 03172045ACSJ.

00:37 - Remainder of patrol 03172045OCHA (Houlihan, Warnick, Bowman) RTB.  See AAR 03172045ACHA.


18MAR1989, Thursday
14:00 - Blazer 77 (Bowman, Stein, White, Cox) go on patrol.  See form 03181330OCBA.

14:10 - Tahoe 88 (Warnick, Thomas D., Thomas Da., Shepard) go on patrol.  See form 03181331OCBA.

17:30 - FV571 incapacitated in ditch at 40034533.

18:00 - Patrols 03181330OCBA and 03181331OCBA complete.  See AARs 03181330ACBA and 03181331ACBA.


19MAR1989, Friday
08:00 - Patrol departs for area Foraker around 403450.  See OPORD 03190730OCSJ.

12:09 - Six enemy casualties.  Two 315th RRC soldiers KIA.

12:47 - Patrol 03190730OCSJ returns.  See AARs 03190825ACSJ and 03190830ACSJ.

21:04 - FV571 recovered from ditch.


20MAR1989, Saturday
09:05 - All available company assets go on mobile defense patrol.  See OPORD 03200800OCHA.

12:37 - Patrol 03200800OCHA complete.  See AAR 03200800ACHA.

12:50 -  Soviet and East German forces withdraw from Czechoslovakia.  Great Britain, Australia, and the United States end active war against the Soviet Union.
« Last Edit: April 04, 2010, 08:10:39 pm by Houli » Logged
Houli
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« Reply #2 on: April 03, 2010, 10:52:19 pm »


ISSUES


1. AAR 03190825ACHA
a. Radio and CEOI not utilized.  RTO dispatched from patrol to RTB in order to get intelligence back because CEOI too difficult to use.


2. AAR 03190830ACHA
a. Patrol members did not know how to use claymore mines.

b. Patrol member controlling claymore detonation could not see kill zone from his ambush position.

c. Poor situational awareness.  When two patrol members ambushed Russian patrol, remaining three patrol members did not know contact was occurring.


3. AAR 03181330ACBA
a. No 5-line created for contact.


4. AAR 03181331
a. Patrol leader distracted from coordinating with patrol members due to coordination with attached FV571 crew.

b. FV571 stuck in ditch on trail side at 40034533 at 18MAR19891730.

c. Poor security around FV571.


5. AAR 03172045ACHA
a. Failure to WARNO troops.

b. Radio failure after patrol left base.

c. Administrative misunderstanding regarding vehicle limit of advance.

d. Commander being indecisive as soon as FRAGO was required by mission circumstances.

e. Commander husbanding information by not communicating his intent nor mission details, thus leaving patrol members in the dark.


6. Patrols step of consistently late
a. Command not consistently delivering FRAGOs in a timely fashion.
b. Squad leaders not issuing FRAGO to squad members.
c. Patrol members not preparing their gear before the FRAGO.
d. Command not correctly estimating time need between FRAGO and patrol step-off.


7. Admin net communications unreliable
a. Many instances where administrative coordination was imperative, such communication was not possible.


8. Troops’ too much gear
a. Troops carrying too much personal gear into the field.  The more adverse the weather, the more difficult it is to move gear and equipment.


9. Lack of personnel accountability
a. Watch schedule not done until Tuesday.
     i. 1st Sgt. creating schedule with no balance in personnel assignment.
     ii. CO not finishing required fixes until Tuesday.
b. Attendees coming and going from event unexpectedly.
c. Persons leaving camp without informing anyone.


10. Stand-to was poor
a. CO requested stand-to instruction and rehearsal many times, but that did not happen.
b. CO repeatedly did not coordinate correctly with the 1st Sgt., nor ask the other officers if they had information to disseminate at stand-to.
c. Scenario information repeatedly disseminated late.
d. 1st Sgt. changed in the middle of the week.


11. CEOI not employed
a. Primarily, nature of missions at EW3 did not require radio communication between the patrol and HQ.

b. Secondarily, the new CEOI format requires significantly more time to encrypt messages.

c. Critical (and simple) parts of CEOI (for example: challenge/password, running password, number encryption) not used.


12. Poor coordination with mess section
a. CO not keeping mess schedule up to date.
b. Mess section not being responsive on the radio.
c. 1st Sgt. not managing the company to get them to dinner or get dinner to them.


13. Organizational problems due to no-squad format
a. Patrols often did not have call signs before they stepped off.
b. Patrols occasionally having Succession of Command before they step off, risking chaos in the event of patrol leader casualty.
c. Patrols almost never divided into fire teams, risking chaos in the event of react to contact.
d. Lack of personnel accountability:  Who has been fed?  Who is available to go on patrol?  Etc.
« Last Edit: April 03, 2010, 10:57:20 pm by Houli » Logged
Houli
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« Reply #3 on: April 03, 2010, 10:52:49 pm »


FIXES


1. AAR 03190825ACHA
a. CEOI practice.  Potentially employ a more usable CEOI.


2. AAR 03190830ACHA
a. PCI before each patrol, ensuring that each patrol member knows how to use all necessary gear.

b. Once claymore is positioned and detonator is in ambush position, have another patrol member walk through the kill zone to ensure that the detonator can see the kill zone.

c. Keep ambush localized such that audible communication supplemented by combat sounds are loud enough to provide situational awareness to all patrol members.


3. AAR 03181330ACBA
a. Once combat has concluded and area is secure, complete 5-line report before RTB.


4. AAR 03181331
a. Utilize FV517 crew’s Clansman radio.  Equip patrol leader or RTO with PRC68 or PCR77, enabling patrol leader to coordinate with FV571 crew easily.

b. Route recon all roads and routes before utilization by FV571.

c. Employ fix a, enabling patrol leader to utilize infantry for FV571 security.


5. AAR 03172045ACHA
a. CO, S2, and 1st Sgt. ready and available in TOC at time of mission conception, such that OPORD can be issued by 1st Sgt. to patrol leader in a timely manner.

b. PCI including comm check before patrol step off.

c. Clearer, more precise, and more detailed communication between NATO and East Bloc administrators and commanders.

d. Commander not over thinking and simply making the best decision with the available information, as opposed to seeking for the “right” decision based on limited information.

e. Commander issue a complete and detailed OPORD with attention given to answer patrol member’s questions.


6. Patrols step of consistently late
a. Command issuing WARNO to the squad leader enough time in advance of the OPORD for squad members prepare the equipment required by the FRAGO.
b. Squad leaders FRAGO squad members.
c. Squad leader and members prepare all gear required by the FRAGO before the OPORD is issued.
d. Command understands and correctly estimates the prep time that must occur after the FRAGO, such as S4 checkout time.


7. Admin net communications unreliable
All admin stations (EW3 admin stations were Soviet HQ, East German HQ, NATO HQ, and NATO Mess) must:
a. If possible, be equipped with a radio capable of transmitting and receiving from all other admin stations.
b. Perform admin net radio checks at specified times such as 0000, 0400 0800, 1000, 1200, 1400, 1600, 1800, and 2000.  Radio checks must confirm transmission to and from all other stations.
c. Improve admin net monitoring skills:  Regularly check volume, squelch, and channel/frequency settings.


8. Troops’ too much gear
a. Encourage players to analyze what they do need and what they don’t need, and have them bring only what they do need.
b. Allow only officers, the 1st Sgt, and personnel with special equipment needs such as vehicle operators to bring field desks.


9.  Lack of personnel accountability
a. See 1st Sgt Roles and Responsibilities Form.
b. (Discussion located in administrative AAR).
c. Persons do not leave camp without coordination with command.  1st Sgt. keeps up to date troop in/out-of-base board in TOC.


10. Stand-to was poor
a. Rehearse stand-to with all officers and 1st Sgt. at field craft weekend.
b. (Discussion located in administrative AAR).
c. Disseminate scenario information in a timely manner.
d. (Discussion located in administrative AAR).

11. CEOI not employed
a. The new CEOI will get used more when we need it more.  Perhaps it will be more needed if EW4 is larger and more effectively tactically run.
b. Practice, practice, practice.  If after much practice, message encryption still takes too much time, then switch to a different CEOI format.
c. S6 ensure that personnel know critical (and simple) parts of CEOI.


12.  Poor coordination with mess section
a. See Mess Scheduling Process form.
b. Equip the mess section with a radio capable of effective and reliable transmission.
c. See Mess Scheduling Process form.


13. Organizational problems due to no-squad format
Keeping track of troops is only possible in a no-squad structure if the total number of full time participants is less than 15 and command is proficient at company organization and oversight.
a. Patrols often did not have call signs before they stepped off.
b. Patrols occasionally having Succession of Command before they step off, risking chaos in the event of patrol leader casualty.
c. Patrols almost never divided into fire teams, risking chaos in the event of react to contact.
d. Lack of personnel accountability:  Who has been fed?  Who is available to go on patrol?  Etc.
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« Reply #4 on: April 04, 2010, 07:39:27 am »

Finally, the AAR is up!

My information is not in normal AAR format, because I was not party to much of the planning, so it was hard to come up with anything useful in that format. Instead, it's a few areas where there were the most egregious problems. Note that these are all things that are easy to fix. I am bringing them up due to my disappointment that we should have been able to carry out these tasks in a correct, and useful manner.

Communications:
1) Procedure - Abysmal adherance to simple radio procedure. Numbers read as strings ("forty one," not "four" "one"), no station identifiers, poor use of "break" and "out." These make it difficult to actually communicate on the radio. I cannot understand you.
2) Communication Security - The CEOI is "hard to use" because radio was almost entirely improperly employed. The only radios used in this timeframe were for tactical communications. Issued to the platoon (maybe squad) and used to communicate well-formatted information between them and the next higher level of command. Much of the use of radios at EW3 was trying to get a "soldier intercom," or a handy-talkie in everyone's hand. This did not exist in that timeframe, and we did not issue gear to allow it. Below tactical radio you have to use hand signals, flare, lights, whistles, and simply yell at people.
Military regs do not allow use of plaintext traffic or made-up codes on unencrypted radios. This is why we train this stuff, and provided the type and quantity of equipment and the codebooks we did.

Movement & Navigation:
1) All on roads. Silly. Commies moved on foot in back country and on small trails; They set it up with defile markers, wire and rope to assure rapid movement under cover. Even when NATO movement off roads happened, there was minimal planning, so it was noisy, slow and tiring.
2) Marching order? Even when in serious enemy territory, it was like a bunch of 4th graders walking to school; Order was random, people are vying for lead, etc. And luckily no one tried to ambush us, because mostly people were head down, or everyone is looking left.
3) No accountability. Only once did I see us pass a count, including many night movements of the whole Company to and from dinner. And we were poor at stopping at fences, gates, etc. We can easily loose people, for serious admin purposes, forget tactical need.
4) Cover? Even when marching in those ad-hoc lines, no one looked their intended direction (alternating left/right) and not enough looked behind. I took trail a lot to make sure that happened.
5) Who pulled out a compass? Never saw it. Saw people being lost. Never saw courses plotted during mission planning, any pacecounts, even terrain association of any serious value.

Orders & Mission Prep:
1) Almost no WARNOs. And almost never enough time when they were given. Not enough info was given when they were issued (night mission, lasts 4 hours) when given, meaning everyone was often not ready.
2) Essentially no PCI; regular surprises that items failed in the field.
3) No consideration of special equipment needs during mission planning; Why not ask others or go to S4 /before/ the last minute?
4) Generally, missions planned in too much isolation. Ask for help, delegate, mention the problem and see who has solutions or info to share.
5) Opords confusing, incorrect situation and regularly missing items that were readily available (e.g. weather).
6) Tactical directions by field commanders often excessively short or missing, resulting in confusion and units becoming separated. Aside from the number I saw, /entirely/ too many returning troops came back not knowing where the rest of the unit was or what happened to them.

Leadership, Procedure, Accountability:
1) Few AARs, poorly run.
2) Minimal distribution of information from higher. Numerous new situation reports kept to the senior tactical leadership or Co Cdr alone.
3) No significant analysis of intelligence, essentially no dissemination of that intelligence to everyone.
4) Co Cdr spent significant time in the field, meaning large portions of the action were on this schedule or based on whim of what would be fun to engage in. Ceded pace to the enemy as a result. Strongly suggest co cdr not /allowed/ to have a rifle next time around; the best way to fight is to lead.
5) No one seemed to want to account for anything. Only yelling at people meant they checked stuff out. Meals were mostly not accounted for, and it was a fight to check off the few I did manage to account for. Hence the one time I told everyone to piss off and we'll just /hope/ everyone got an MRE. It takes everyone's participation to make sure everyone is fed and gear is issued out in an accountable manner.
6) Equipment was too often turned-in in poor condition, and during the striking of the camp, many things were improperly disassembled or packed. Especially in rain and mud, this matters. Be more careful or there's not gonna be any expensive, useful stuff brought into the field anymore.


Again, note that these are all skills, attitudes and behaviors I have seen pretty much all of you use successfully in training. There is no reason these skills should all be forgotten when in the field.
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« Reply #5 on: April 04, 2010, 08:52:18 am »

15:30 - Patrol 03161311OCDW ambushes two enemy at 46104043.  Two enemy killed, including Russian Company Commander Josef Jakinovich Abikov.  Intel gathered from enemy.  See AAR 03161211ACSJ.

I have a few questions on this.

I see nowhere above that you identified that you were facing a company or really any info on who you were facing.
How did you know that there was a Russian Company across from you? And not a Battalion or Division or even just a Platoon?
How did you know he was a Company commander? Even if he did have rank on it would have been as a Jr. Lt which is a not a normal rank for a Company commander.

Did his notebook have all this information in it?

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Houli
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« Reply #6 on: April 04, 2010, 12:27:22 pm »

Yes,

I thought about those details you mention, particularly regarding to the identification of Abica as company commander, but I decided I didn't care, and just wrote what I wanted to write.
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« Reply #7 on: April 04, 2010, 01:25:30 pm »

OK - great.
Good to see folks can really get into the role-playing and forget what they read on the forum before the event.

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Houli
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« Reply #8 on: April 04, 2010, 08:11:38 pm »

Yes, I cut a corner.
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